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Abstract 
 
This study is an empirical examination of the use of malpractice insurance by indepen-
dent auditors. Higher insurance premiums are found in states that utilize the foreseea-
ble third-party standard. Auditors who perceive higher litigation risk are found to be 
willing to bear higher insurance premiums and to opt for higher coverage. Overall, the 
results suggest that state tort provisions influence litigation risk and malpractice in-
surance is used to mitigate this risk.
1
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
udit litigation is an important topic in the 
academic and practitioner literature (see 
Latham and Linville, 1998 or Palmrose, 
1997 for a review of the literature). As lit-
igation risk increases, the CPA firm must view 
each audit engagement (and other service offer-
ing) as a potential source of litigation. The CPA 
firm has several ways of managing this litigation 
risk. These include client screening, limitation of 
services, producing high-quality work, and other 
practice management procedures (See Latham 
and Linville, 1998 or Demery, 1995b) for a com-
plete discussion). Another tool that can be used to 
manage litigation risk is professional malpractice 
insurance. 
 
Malpractice insurance, like all insurance, is used 
to mitigate catastrophic losses. By paying a 
smaller, fixed sum, the insured CPA can avoid 
paying a larger, uncertain amount upon the de-
termination of wrongdoing (Mehr, et al., 1985, 
33) The insurance company collects the premium 
__________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encour-
aged to contact the authors via email. 
from the policyholders and then pays the damages 
to those hurt by the actions of the policyholders. 
The insurance company profits from this ar-
rangement by charging premiums high enough to 
cover the damages that must be paid (Mehr, et al., 
1985, 663).
2
  This process spreads the risk of liti-
gation across all of the insured practitioners and 
ultimately, through fees, to the auditor‟s clients.  
 
Examination of the use of malpractice insur-
ance and the malpractice insurance marketplace 
can provide valuable knowledge about litigation 
risk. Insurers have extensive information about 
claims which can be used to determine the factors 
associated with litigation risk (Stimpson, 1998). 
Since insurers use this information to set insur-
ance premiums, some of this knowledge may be 
revealed by the premium. Also, by examining the 
insurance choices made by CPA firms and how 
these choices vary as the perception of litigation 
risk changes, an understanding of how (or if) 
malpractice insurance is used to mitigate litiga-
tion risk may be gained. 
 
This paper examines two specific issues re-
lated to the use of malpractice insurance. First, if 
legal liability is influenced by state tort provi-
sions, insurance premiums should vary as these 
legal provisions increase litigation risk. Several 
A 
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risk factors that affect the insurance premium are 
examined as controls but this study focuses on the 
state in which the policyholder operates as a 
proxy for litigation risk. The second issue ex-
amined is how insurance decisions made by the 
policyholder are influenced by the policyholder‟s 
perception of the litigation risk.  
 
Insurance premiums are found to vary direct-
ly with the state tort provision alleged to be the 
most important in audit-related litigation: third-
party liability standards (AICPA, 1995). Cover-
age levels, total audit fees, and total fees are also 
found to influence the premium charged. Further, 
with the perception of higher litigation risk, the 
policyholder is willing to pay a higher premium 
and selects higher levels of coverage. The percep-
tion of higher litigation risk has no effect on the 
choice of deductible levels. 
 
The paper is organized in this fashion. Hypo-
theses are developed in the next section. The em-
pirical design is discussed in the third section. In 
that section, necessary controls are developed, the 
empirical models used to test the hypotheses are 
formulated, and issues of data collection are dis-
cussed. Section four reports the results. The paper 
concludes with a discussion and then suggestions 
for further research. 
 
Hypothesis Development 
 
This study examines two insurance issues. 
The first issue is an examination of insurance 
premiums to determine if CPA firms in states 
with higher litigation risk are paying higher pre-
miums. The second issue is an examination of the 
insurance choices made by auditors based on their 
perceptions of the litigation risk. 
 
For the first hypothesis, litigation risk is de-
fined by third-party liability standards. Third-
party liability standards are used to determine 
which third parties allegedly damaged by an in-
appropriate audit report can proceed with a civil 
lawsuit against the auditor (Miller and Young, 
1997). The most restrictive of these standards 
(and the standard hypothesized to impose the 
lowest litigation risk on the auditor) is the privity 
standard which has two general variations. Under 
a strict privity standard, only the contracting party 
can sue the auditor for a negligently-performed 
audit (Pacini and Sinason, 1998).
3
  Near-privity 
extends the right to bring a civil lawsuit against 
an auditor for a negligently-performed audit to a 
clearly-defined primary beneficiary. Although 
less restrictive than privity, near-privity is still a 
restrictive third-party standard (Pacini and Sina-
son, 1998). For the purposes of this study, strict 
privity and near-privity are considered to be one 
standard referred to simply as privity. The least 
restrictive third-party liability standard (and the 
standard hypothesized to impose the highest liti-
gation risk on the auditor) is the foreseeable stan-
dard. Under this standard, any third-party that was 
reasonably foreseeable by the auditor has the right 
to sue the auditor for a negligently-performed au-
dit (Miller and Young, 1997).  
 
According to the American Institute of Certi-
fied Public Accountants (AICPA, 1995), the two 
primary legal provisions that affect litigation risk 
are third-party liability standards and liability-
sharing standards. In the model developed by 
Linville (2000), third-party liability standards are 
shown to impose more risk on auditors than lia-
bility-sharing standards. In 1991, the year for 
which data were collected, the six states used in 
this study had joint and several liability for eco-
nomic damages. Since the lesser of the two most 
important standards, the liability-sharing stan-
dards, is constant across the six states in this 
study, it is assumed that the effect of the most im-
portant, third-party liability standards, dominates 
the effect of any other legal standards which 
might vary across the states. 
 
The foreseeable standard increases the num-
ber of parties that can bring a civil action against 
the auditor which increases the auditor‟s litigation 
risk (Lys and Watts, 1994; Nelson, et al., 1988). 
Consistent with Nelson, et al. (1988), states using 
a privity standard represent the low-litigation-risk 
environment and states using a foreseeable stan-
dard represent the high-litigation-risk environ-
ment. If state tort provisions impose litigation risk 
on the auditor, it is reasonable to assume that in-
surance premiums vary directly with litigation 
risk. This argument suggests the first hypothesis: 
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H1: CPA firms in states with higher litigation risk 
(the foreseeable states) pay higher insurance 
premiums than CPA firms in states with low-
er litigation risk (the privity states).
4
 
 
Three hypotheses relate to the choices that a 
CPA firm faces in determining the appropriate 
mix of professional malpractice insurance. Once a 
CPA firm makes a decision to purchase profes-
sional malpractice insurance, it must choose the 
amount of premium that will be paid and the le-
vels of coverage and deductible. Each factor in-
fluences the other. For the purpose of developing 
the hypotheses, the effect of each factor on the 
other is ignored. The effect of simultaneous esti-
mation in the empirical model is discussed in the 
next section. 
 
In each of the following hypotheses, the in-
surance provisions selected are assumed to vary 
depending on the CPA firm‟s perception of the 
litigation risk. Each respondent to the survey is 
asked to provide their perceptions on the litigation 
risk in their state along five dimensions. The per-
ceptions of litigation risk on each of the five di-
mensions are combined to measure the respon-
dent‟s overall perception of the litigation risk.  
 
If a CPA firm perceives high litigation risk, 
professional malpractice insurance should be 
more desirable. In other words, the protection of 
the insurance is perceived to be more likely to be 
utilized. As with any other product, if insurance 
coverage becomes more desirable, the amount 
that a CPA firm would be willing to pay would 
increase, ceteris paribus. This suggests: 
  
H2: CPA firms which perceive a higher level of 
litigation risk are willing to pay a higher 
premium than CPA firms that perceive a 
lower level of litigation risk. 
 
As litigation risk is perceived as being 
higher, higher levels of coverage should be more 
desirable. As litigation risk increases, auditors are 
likely to envision higher potential damages for the 
lawsuits that might be filed. Indeed, the reason 
that the perceptions of litigation risk may be high 
is the visibility of the lawsuits in the auditor‟s 
state. This visibility usually comes from the large 
damage amounts associated with the lawsuit but 
the frequency of lawsuits may also increase the 
perception of litigation risk. If the frequency of 
lawsuits increases, the possibility of a CPA firm 
being involved in multiple lawsuits increases. 
Higher coverage in this situation is desirable if 
the multiple lawsuits deplete other sources of 
damage payments (payments from current reve-
nues, partial liquidation of partnership assets, the 
use of personal assets, etc.). These suggest the 
third hypothesis: 
 
H3: CPA firms which perceive a higher level of 
litigation risk select higher levels of coverage 
than CPA firms that perceive a lower level of 
litigation risk. 
 
The perception of litigation risk may also af-
fect the choice of insurance deductible in ways 
which may lead to the selection of different de-
ductible levels. If the CPA firm is concerned with 
reducing the amount of premium that must be 
paid, the auditor would select a higher deductible. 
On the other hand, if the CPA firm adopts a more 
global approach to litigation costs and seeks to 
minimize the total costs, the level of deductible 
may be set at a lower level. Although the auditor 
would pay a higher insurance premium imme-
diately, if a claim is made against the insurance 
policy, the lower deductible would require a 
smaller out-of-pocket payment later. This strategy 
reduces total litigation costs if the savings on out-
of-pocket payments are greater than the increased 
insurance premium. It is not clear which of these 
two responses to insurance costs the auditor 
would adopt. The auditor‟s response to increased 
litigation risk may be to increase or to decrease 
the insurance deductible, suggesting the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H4: CPA firms which perceive a higher level of 
litigation risk select a different level of de-
ductible than CPA firms that perceive a lower 
level of litigation risk. 
 
Empirical Design 
 
Two different models are estimated, each 
with a different test variable. The first model (re-
ferred to as the premium model) uses the actual 
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third-party liability standards to define the litiga-
tion risk. Privity should represent the low-
litigation-risk situation and the foreseeable stan-
dard the high-litigation-risk situation. The second 
model (referred to as the choice model) uses the 
CPA firms‟ perceptions to define the litigation 
risk used to make insurance choices. It is assumed 
that these perceptions determine the desirability 
of insurance and thus, are used to make insurance 
choices. These perceptions about litigation risk 
can be different than the litigation risk defined by 
third-party standards. 
 
Model Variables 
 
Several variables are introduced to control 
for variation attributable to causes other than the 
hypothesized ones. These control variables are of 
two types: the insurance policy parameters and 
idiosyncratic risk factors of the individual policy-
holders. 
 
Policy Parameters 
 
Two insurance policy parameters affect the 
premium that is charged. The coverage amount 
determines the upper limit of damages which the 
insurance company will cover for the policyhold-
er (Mehr, et al., 1985, 207). Any damage amount 
beyond this cap is the responsibility of the poli-
cyholder. As the coverage amount increases, the 
insurance premium increases to compensate the 
insurance company who accepts the responsibility 
for a higher potential payout. The insurance poli-
cy also typically contains a deductible amount 
(Mehr, et al., 1985, 220). This deductible is the 
amount that must be paid by the policyholder in 
the event of a claim. This deductible amount is 
applied to the first dollars of the claim. In such a 
fashion, a claim less than the deductible amount is 
the sole responsibility of the policyholder (Mehr, 
et al., 1985, 222). As the deductible amount is re-
duced, the insurance company is responsible for a 
larger amount of the total damage claim which 
suggests premiums would increase. 
 
Each of these policy parameters are intro-
duced into both models. The premium model uses 
them as control variables and the choice model 
uses them as dependent variables for the system 
of equations because these variables are chosen 
by the policyholder. Since the choice model uti-
lizes simultaneous estimation, each also acts im-
plicitly as a control on the other dependent va-
riables. 
 
Idiosyncratic Factors 
 
Identifiable firm characteristics that increase 
litigation risk are used by the insurance compa-
nies to set insurance premiums (Booker, 1973).
5
 
Several of these factors are introduced here to 
control for the idiosyncratic risk posed by each 
auditing firm. The listing of firm characteristics 
represents a parsimonious set of the information 
collected by the insurance carrier during the ap-
plication process.
6
 
 
The risk of litigation is related to the sheer 
number of clients for several reasons. As the audi-
tor services a larger number of clients, the amount 
of attention that can be devoted to each client de-
creases (Covaleski, 1998). The possibility that 
one of these clients will feel that the quality of 
services has fallen below acceptable levels in-
creases. If the possibility of initiating a lawsuit is 
constant across clients, simply increasing the 
number of clients mechanically increases the 
chance that the CPA firm will be sued in any giv-
en time period. Also, increasing the number of 
clients likely increases the diversity of the client 
portfolio. As this diversity increases, the chal-
lenges to the auditor to know about the reporting 
standards, accounting practices, and other client- 
or industry-specific items increase (Covaleski, 
1998). As the number of clients increase, client 
screening and evaluation becomes more difficult. 
This increases the chance that a CPA firm accepts 
or retains a client that it should not have. Finally, 
as discussed earlier, if the number of clients in-
crease, the number of audit report users increase 
expanding the auditor‟s litigation risk (Nelson, et 
al., 1988). For all these not-mutually-exclusive 
reasons, the number of clients should increase the 
litigation risk and as a result, a control variable 
for the number of clients is introduced into each 
model. 
 
The size of the audit clients could also affect 
the auditor‟s litigation risk (Murray, 1992, 68). 
The Journal of Applied Business Research                                                    Volume 17, Number 3 
 65 
Larger organizations are likely to have more par-
ties that rely upon the auditor‟s report. If a subs-
tandard audit is performed, a larger client is likely 
to have more parties that are economically dam-
aged by reliance on the audit report. This larger 
pool of injured parties increases the auditor‟s liti-
gation risk for two reasons. Anyone of these in-
jured parties could possibility initiate a civil law-
suit to recover damages increasing the probability 
of such a lawsuit.
7, 8 
Also because of the larger 
number of injured parties, the potential level of 
damages is higher. For these reasons, the total au-
dit fees are introduced into each model as a con-
trol.
9
 
 
The defendant auditor‟s ability to pay could 
also affect the possibility of lawsuits (the „deep 
pockets‟ problem) (Alexander, 1991). One meas-
ure of the ability to pay would be the total firm 
revenues. In other words, although the CPA firm 
is being sued for audit malfeasance, the revenues 
from tax, consulting, write-up, or other services 
may be used to pay the damages. Total revenues 
are likely to be positively correlated to insurance 
coverage and provide the plaintiff an indication of 
the CPA firm‟s total ability to pay. To the extent 
that the total revenues increase the probability of 
a lawsuit, insurance premiums should increase. 
For this reason, total revenues are introduced into 
the premium model as a control variable since the 
initiation of a lawsuit increases the chances that 
the insurance company will have to pay damages. 
 
Ability to pay is also introduced into the 
choice model as a control variable. The plaintiff 
has the three primary sources of damages from 
the defendant: insurance payments, payments 
from the firm, and payments from the principals‟ 
personal assets. The CPA firm‟s primary concern 
in risk management is likely to protect personal 
assets. An organizational form that protects per-
sonal assets should affect insurance choices. At 
the time of the survey, respondents had the option 
of organizing as a partnership or a professional 
corporation which in certain cases could provide 
very limited protection of personal assets.
10
 Since 
it could affect the ability to pay and may be 
viewed by the potential policyholder as partial 
protection against litigation risk, organizational 
form is introduced into the choice model as a con-
trol variable. 
 
The number of CPAs in the auditing firm is 
also likely to increase litigation risk. Each CPA 
can perform an act which results in a lawsuit. The 
more CPAs in a firm the greater the likelihood 
that one of them will perform negligently. A larg-
er number of CPAs also increases the difficulty of 
control within the CPA firm. As quoted in De-
mery (1995a, 68), the manager of Cal Accoun-
tants Insurance Co. (or CAMICO) stated: “Every-
one in the firm can potentially add to liability.” 
As a result, the number of CPAs in the firm is en-
tered as a control variable into each model. 
 
Test Variables 
 
The test variable in the premium model is the 
indicator variable for the state‟s litigation risk. If 
the state uses foreseeability (privity) as the third-
party liability standard, the litigation risk is as-
sumed to be high (low) and the indictor variable 
is coded 1 (0).  
 
The test variable in the choice model is the 
perception of the CPA firm about the litigation 
risk. Five survey questions are asked to measure 
perceptions about the litigation risk. The res-
ponses are combined into one summary measure 
of litigation risk. 
 
Models 
 
The premium model is used to test hypothesis 
one. The amount of the insurance premium is the 
dependent variable. The third-party liability stan-
dards are used to determine the litigation risk 
which is the test variable.  The premium model: 
 
The coefficient of each variable in the pre-
mium model is predicted to be positive except for 
the coefficient on the deductible variable which is 
predicted to be negative. No prediction is made 
about the intercept. 
 
The choice model is a simultaneous-
equations model. The insurance premium that the 
CPA firm is willing to pay, the coverage level de-
sired, and the deductible desired are simulta-
neously determined and are the dependent va-
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riables in the equations of the simultaneous-
equations model. The significance of the coeffi-
cient on the test variable, perception of risk, is 
used to test hypotheses two through four. The 
choice model: 
 
The coefficient on each variable in the choice 
model is predicted to be positive except for the 
coefficient on the perception of risk variable in 
equation three which has no predicted sign. No 
predictions are made about the intercept. 
 
Data Collection 
 
Data were collected by survey in late 1993 
and early 1994. The names of CPA firms with 
five to twelve CPAs located in selected states 
were obtained from the American Institute of Cer-
tified Public Accountants. Six states were selected 
because either privity (New York, Kansas, Illi-
nois) or foreseeability (New Jersey, California, 
Wisconsin) was used in 1991 to determine third-
party liability. All information was collected for 
the year of 1991, a year in which no major 
changes were made in these states‟ audit-related 
tort provisions.  
 
Eight hundred and twenty-eight surveys were 
mailed and 207 were returned for an overall re-
sponse rate of 25%. This response rate compares 
with other reported response rates (Quint, 1995; 
Thompson and Henry, 1991). Failure to respond 
to all questions reduced the sample for this study 
to 148. Obviously, any CPA firm not carrying 
malpractice insurance (going „bare‟) cannot be 
part of this sample since the firm would have no 
policy-related data. Forty-three (43) firms in the 
sample did not carry malpractice insurance and 16 
firms were dropped from the final sample for fail-
ing to provide other necessary information.  
 
Results 
 
In the overall sample, 21% (n = 43) of the 
CPA firms report that they carry no malpractice 
insurance. This rate is comparable to the findings 
of Quint (1995) who reports that 28% of the CPA 
firms with less than $500,000 in revenues go 
„bare‟. Thompson and Henry (1991) find that 
35.7% of CPA firms with annual revenues less 
than $1 million have no malpractice insurance but 
this rate drops to 15.8% for firms with between 
$1 million and $5 million in annual revenues and 
to 0% for firms with between $5 million and $25 
million in annual revenues. Since the average rev-
enues of the firms in this sample is $1.6 million, 
the reported rate of uninsured CPA firms in this 
sample is comparable to Thompson and Henry‟s 
finding. Wolosky (1995) reports a considerably 
higher percentage of uninsured CPA firms at 
47%.  
 
Table 1 reports the results of the ordinary-
least-squares estimation of the premium model. 
This is a test of hypothesis one which predicts 
that insurance premiums will be higher in states 
with a foreseeable standard of third-party liability 
than in the states with a privity standard. The 
coefficients on the control variables of coverage 
(p < 0.0000), audit fees (p = 0.0934), and total 
fees (p < 0.0000) are significant. The coefficients 
on the control variables of deductible (p = 
0.6635), number of clients (p = 0.4286), and 
number of CPAs (p = 0.1075) are not significant 
at conventional levels. The overall model is sig-
nificant (p < 0.001). 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
The coefficient on the litigation risk variable 
is highly significant (p = 0.0122). Auditors in 
states with the less restrictive third-party standard 
pay higher malpractice insurance premiums after 
controlling for coverage, deductible, and idiosyn-
cratic factors. This result suggests that actuaries 
view a less restrictive third-party liability stan-
 
Equation one: 
premium =   b0 + b1(organizational form) + b2(CPAs) + b3(log of audit billings)  
   + b4(perception of risk) + e            (2a) 
 
Equation two: 
coverage =   b0 + b1(organizational form) + b2(CPAs) + b3(log of audit billings)  
   + b4(perception of risk) + e            (2b) 
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dard as imposing a higher litigation risk on audi-
tors. Hypothesis one is strongly supported. 
 
Table 2 reports the results of the regressions 
on the insurance-choice decisions. A three-stage-
least-squares estimation is used. The coefficient 
on the control variable of the number of CPAs is 
significant in all three equations (p-values range 
from less than 0.0000 to 0.0024). The coefficient 
on the control variable of organizational form 
does not achieve significance in any of the three 
equations. The coefficient on the control variable 
of audit billings achieves significance in the pre-
mium equation (p = 0.0764) but not in the other 
equations. 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
 The coefficient on the test variable, percep-
tion of litigation risk, achieves significance in two 
of the three equations. The overall system of equ-
ations in the model is highly significant (p < 
0.001). 
 
In equation one where premium is the depen-
dent variable, the coefficient on the perception of 
litigation risk is highly significant (p = 0.0099). 
This suggests that as CPA firms perceive a higher 
litigation risk, they are willing to bear a higher 
premium. This result can be interpreted in this fa-
shion. As litigation risk increases, professional 
malpractice insurance is more valuable to the po-
licyholder and as a result of this greater value, a 
higher premium can be tolerated. Hypothesis two 
is strongly supported. 
 
The coefficient on the perception of litigation 
risk variable is significant (p = 0.0495) in equa-
tion two where coverage is the dependent varia-
ble. This suggests that as the perception of litiga-
tion risk increases, the auditor opts for higher in-
surance coverage. Hypothesis three is supported. 
 
The third equation in the system is used to 
test hypothesis three which predicts a different 
deductible as the perception of litigation risk in-
creases. The coefficient on the perception of liti-
gation risk variable is not significant (p = 0.7642). 
Hypothesis four is not supported which suggests 
that the amount of deductible selected is not in-
fluenced by the perception of risk. 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
 
This study examines the use of professional 
malpractice insurance by CPA firms to limit their 
litigation exposure. Specifically, insurance pre-
miums are examined to determine the factors 
which insurance companies feel are associated 
with litigation risk. Also, this study examines how 
the use of malpractice insurance is influenced by 
the CPA firms‟ perception of litigation risk. 
The premium charged auditors for malprac-
tice insurance is found to be significantly influ-
enced by the level of coverage, the amount of au-
dit fees, the amount of total fees, and the state in 
which the policyholder practices. The policyhold-
ers in states with a foreseeable standard of third-
party liability are charged a higher premium, after 
controlling for other fee-influencing factors, than 
policyholders in states with a privity standard of 
third-party liability.  
A system of simultaneous equations is used 
to examine the change in insurance choices asso-
ciated with a change of perceptions of litigation 
risk. The system of simultaneous equations is 
used to allow for simultaneous selection of a 
premium level, coverage level, and deductible 
level. CPA firms who perceive higher levels of 
litigation risk are more tolerant of bearing high 
insurance premiums. In other words, if the poten-
tial benefits are perceived to be high enough, 
higher premium costs can be borne. CPA firms 
who perceive a higher litigation risk select higher 
coverage levels. Intuitively, as more risk is per-
ceived, the auditor becomes more sensitized to lit-
igation concerns and the advantages of higher in-
surance coverage become more apparent. The de-
ductible is not sensitive to changes in the percep-
tions of litigation risk. Overall, these results are 
consistent with the use of malpractice insurance 
as a tool to mitigate litigation risk.  
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
 
Several extensions to this study remain. A 
more comprehensive examination of the setting of 
insurance premiums would contribute greatly to 
the understanding of litigation risk factors. A 
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model to establish the determinants in setting an 
insurance premium would provide a glimpse into 
the actuaries‟ understanding of the factors asso-
ciated with litigation risk. Another line of re-
search would examine the interaction between the 
use of insurance and the use of other litigation-
reduction techniques. The use of insurance in the 
new forms of limited-liability organizations now 
available to the CPA would be an example of this 
type of inquiry.  
 
Endnotes 
 
1. I would like to thank Yoram Barzel, Dave 
Burgstahler, Jim Jiambalvo, Steve Sefcik, 
Naomi Soderstrom, and the participants of 
the Northwest Accounting Research Group 
for their helpful comments. I would like to 
thank CPAs Ron Bishop, Steve Flerchinger, 
and Larry Lucas for their comments on the 
survey instrument. Any remaining errors are 
my own. 
2. Commonly, an insurance company generates 
profits by two means: underwriting profits 
and portfolio profits (Mehr, et al., 1985, 
699). The underwriting profits (described 
above) are contingent upon insurance pre-
miums exceeding damage awards that must 
be paid. Portfolio profits come from the in-
vestment earnings on the asset reserves held 
by the insurance company. These asset re-
serves are created by underwriting profits in 
earlier years which have not been paid out as 
distributions to investors or claimants (Mehr, 
et al., 1985, 691). If underwriting profits de-
cline and premiums cannot be adjusted, the 
insurance company should exit this segment 
of the underwriting business. This phenome-
non occurred in the market for malpractice 
insurance for accountants in the 1980s 
(McDonald, 1995). 
3. If the auditor's malfeasance is alleged to be 
more serious than ordinary negligence (gross 
negligence or fraud), third-party liability 
standards are not applicable. All damaged 
parties can bring a civil lawsuit when these 
more serious forms of malfeasance are al-
leged. 
4. All hypotheses are stated in the alternative 
form. Necessary controls are discussed in the 
next section. 
5. The typical malpractice insurance application 
form is four to six pages long (before sup-
plemental forms) and asks many detailed 
questions. Since data processing is costly, it 
is assumed that each question helps identify a 
factor that has been shown by actuaries to be 
associated with litigation risk. 
6. Few respondents reported any prior claims on 
their insurance policies for audit-related inci-
dents. Since there is little or no variation in 
this variable, it is not added to the model. Its 
inclusion does not change the reported re-
sults. 
7. The larger number of allegedly-damaged par-
ties also makes class-action provisions more 
advantageous to the plaintiff further increas-
ing the probability of a lawsuit. 
8. Whether or not a damaged party can (or will) 
bring a lawsuit depends on many factors. One 
important factor, third-party liability stan-
dards, was discussed earlier. 
9. Since a linear relationship between the de-
pendent variables and the size variables of to-
tal audit fees and total fees is unlikely, the 
natural logs of each size variable are used. 
10. CPA firms today have more options in orga-
nizational form than they did in 1991, the 
time from which the data was collected. 
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